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Traditional economic theory has treated “households” and “consumers” as
synonyms. But would a formal distinction between a household as an eco-
nomic entity and its constituents make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence beyond a mere
descriptive improvement? It does, if one is interested in household labor
supply to market as well as household production, in the diﬀerential eﬀect
of taxes, subsidies and public goods on household members, to name just a
few instances. Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have examined
household related issues, usually relying on partial equilibrium analysis.
We are interested in the behavior and welfare of multi-member households
in a general equilibrium context. This framework allows to investigate the
feedback between decisions at the micro-level, by households and their mem-
bers, and macro-variables, in particular market clearing prices. In special
cases, one is able to perform comparative statics with respect to exogenous
model parameters, like in Gersbach and Haller (2009). Incorporating multi-
member households requires specifying the decision making of such house-
holds. Haller (2000) pioneered the analysis of general equilibrium models
with multi-member households operating in a competitive market environ-
ment. His approach was motivated and inﬂuenced by the model of collective
rationality of households forwarded by Chiappori (1988, 1992).1 Haller con-
siders a ﬁnite pure exchange economy and assumes collective rationality in
its most general form: A household acts collectively in the market, with ef-
ﬁcient bargaining within the household. In a competitive equilibrium, each
household makes an eﬃcient choice under its budget constraint, and markets
clear. The crucial feature is that eﬃcient choice by the household refers to
the individual consumption and welfare of its members, not merely to the
aggregate consumption bundle of the household.
1Alternative models of household decision making have been introduced by Lundberg
and Pollack (1993, 1994) and Apps and Rees (2009), among others.
2First and foremost, two questions arise once a general equilibrium model
with multi-member households is developed: Does the presence of multi-
member households impair the eﬃciency of competitive equilibrium alloca-
tions where eﬃciency or Pareto optimality, to be precise, is deﬁned in terms
of individual preferences? Does the presence of multi-member households
impede the existence of competitive equilibria? Prima facie, one might be
inclined to think that the welfare properties of competitive equilibrium allo-
cations depend on the details of intra-household bargaining. The key insight
of Haller (2000) is that those details do not matter for the validity of the
ﬁrst welfare theorem. It suﬃces that in equilibrium, every household makes
an eﬃcient choice under its budget constraint and, by doing so, exhausts
its budget. This neither requires nor rules out speciﬁc bargaining proto-
cols or decision rules as long as eﬃcient household decisions are reached —
and the budget gets exhausted. Regarding the second question, it turns out
that the aggregate excess demand of a multi-member household has similar
properties as the excess demand of traditional consumers, which suggests
that an equilibrium existence result should obtain via the excess demand ap-
proach. Gersbach and Haller (1999) and Sato (2009) take the excess demand
approach to show equilibrium existence for economies ` a la Haller (2000).
Gori (2010), using homotopy techniques, obtains equilibrium existence for
economies with Nash-bargained household decisions and no intra-household
consumption externalities.
The existing body of work on general equilibrium models with multi-
member households has been conﬁned to pure exchange economies.2 Here
we take a ﬁrst pass at a general equilibrium model with multi-member house-
holds and production. We address the question whether equilibrium existence
results and the ﬁrst welfare theorem can be extended from a pure exchange
2See Gersbach and Haller (1999, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2011), Gori (2010), Gori and
Villanacci (2011), Haller (2000).
3context to a model with production. Extending results for pure exchange
economies to economies with production is often, but not always straight-
forward. A more or less straightforward extension holds true for equilibrium
existence and the ﬁrst and second welfare theorem for ﬁnite Arrow-Debreu
economies, though the proofs turn out to be more elaborate for economies
with production than for pure exchange economies.
We ﬁnd that extension of the ﬁrst welfare theorem proves rather straight-
forward, indeed, though one of us — like perhaps the more sceptical or more
cautious reader — had to be convinced by an explicit proof. Equilibrium
existence with production is shown by following a strategy of proof diﬀerent
from Gersbach and Haller (1999) and Sato (2009) on the one hand and Gori
(2010) on the other hand. We deﬁne induced household preferences for aggre-
gate household consumption so that household choices and production plans
reside in the same Euclidean space. Resorting to a theorem of Debreu (1982)
based on the simultaneous optimization or social equilibrium approach of
Arrow and Debreu (1954), we then show existence of a competitive equilib-
rium for this artiﬁcial economy — which translates into an equilibrium of
the actual economy.
In the next section, we introduce the model and state and demonstrate
our ﬁrst main result, a ﬁrst welfare theorem for ﬁnite economies with multi-
member households and production. Section 3 is devoted to equilibrium
existence. Section 4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 Model and First Main Result
We consider an economy with a ﬁnite number of commodities, ﬁrms and
households. The main departure from the traditional model is that a house-
hold can have several members, each with their own preferences. There are
ℓ ≥ 1 continuous commodities, labeled l ∈ {1,...,ℓ}. Thus the commodity
4space is I R
ℓ.
The population of consumers is divided into ﬁnitely many households
h = 1,...,n, with n ≥ 2. Each household h consists of ﬁnitely many members
i = hm with m = 1,...,mh, mh ≥ 1. Put I = {hm : h = 1,...,n; m =
1,...,mh}, the ﬁnite population of individuals to be considered. There are
ﬁnitely many ﬁrms j = 1,...,f, with f ≥ 1. Let H = {1,...,n} denote the
set of households and J = {1,...,f} denote the set of ﬁrms.
2.1 Technologies and Firm Decisions
Each ﬁrm j has a non-empty production set or technology Yj ⊆ I R
ℓ. The
special case of Yj = {0} for all j amounts to a pure exchange economy. The
objective of a ﬁrm is to maximize its proﬁt, to the extent possible. For a
price system p ∈ I R
ℓ
+ and a ﬁrm j, let
Yj(p) = arg max
yj∈Yj
pyj





so that πj(p) = pyj for yj ∈ Yj(p).
2.2 Allocations and Individual Preferences.
A generic individual i = hm ∈ I has consumption set Xi = I R
ℓ
+. Let X ≡
∏
i∈I Xi be the set of consumption proﬁles and Y ≡
∏
j∈J Yj be the set of
production proﬁles. Then the allocation space is X × Y.
The consumption bundle of a generic individual i is denoted by xi with
xi ∈ Xi. Let x = (xi), x′ = (x′
i) denote generic elements of X. For h =
1,...,n, deﬁne Xh =
∏mh
m=1 Xhm with generic elements xh = (xh1,...,xhmh).
5If x ∈ X is a consumption proﬁle, then for h = 1,...,n, household con-
sumption is given by xh = (xh1,...,xhmh) ∈ Xh. We will allow for the
possibility of consumption externalities. Following Haller (2000), we shall
restrict attention to the case where such consumption externalities, if any,
exist only between members of the same household. This is captured by the
notion of intra-household externalities: For i ∈ h, the welfare of indi-
vidual i depends only on household consumption xh. More speciﬁcally, we
assume that the preferences of individual i have a utility representation
Ui : Xh −→ I R.
We adopt from Gersbach and Haller (2001) the concept of local non-
satiation of multi-person households:
Deﬁnition 1 A household h is locally non-satiated if for every
xh ∈ Xh and every ϵ > 0, there exists x′
h ∈ Xh with
∥ xh − x′
h ∥mhℓ < ϵ and (Ui(x′
h))i∈h > (Ui(xh))i∈h.3
For local non-satiation of household h to hold it suﬃces that there exist a
member hm and a commodity c(h) ∈ {1,...,ℓ} such that (a) the welfare of
hm is strictly increasing in x
c(h)
hm , hm’s consumption of commodity c(h) and
(b) the welfare of all other household members is unaﬀected or positively
aﬀected by hm’s consumption of commodity c(h).
Local non-satiation for all households implies the budget exhaustion prop-
erty (2) assumed in Proposition 1. Local non-satiation for all households is
also one of the assumptions of Proposition 2.
3∥ · ∥d denotes the Euclidean norm on a d-dimensional Euclidean space. We use the
notation ≫; > and ≥ for vector inequalities.
62.3 Property Rights and Household Decisions
Household h is endowed with a commodity bundle ωh ∈ I R
ℓ, ωh > 0. The
aggregate or social endowment is ω =
∑
h ωh. Moreover, household h owns
a share θhj ≥ 0 of ﬁrm j ∈ J. For each ﬁrm,
∑
h θhj = 1.
Given a price system p ∈ I R
ℓ such that Yj(p) ̸= ∅ for all j, household h
has wealth or income




Now consider a household h and a price system p ∈ I R
ℓ. For xh = (xh1,...,xhmh) ∈
Xh,






denotes the total household expenditure on household consumption plan xh
at the price system p. As p and xh are of diﬀerent dimension for multi-
member households, we use the ∗-product in lieu of the familiar inner prod-
uct. If household wealth or income wh(p) is well deﬁned, then h’s budget
set is given as Bh(p) = {xh ∈ Xh : p ∗ xh ≤ wh(p)}. Next we deﬁne the
eﬃcient budget set EBh(p) by:
xh = (xh1,...,xhmh) ∈ EBh(p) if and only if xh ∈ Bh(p) and there is no
x′
h ∈ Bh(p) such that
Uhm(x
′
h) ≥ Uhm(xh) for all m = 1,...,mh;
Uhm(x
′
h) > Uhm(xh) for some m = 1,...,mh.
Thus eﬃcient choice by the household refers to the individual consumption
and welfare of its members, not merely to the aggregate consumption bundle
of the household.
72.4 Feasibility and Optimality
An allocation (x,y) = ((xi)i∈I,(yj)j∈J) ∈ X × Y is feasible if
∑
i∈I




A feasible allocation (x,y) = ((xi)i∈I,(yj)j∈J) is Pareto optimal if there is





h) ≥ Uhm(xh) for all h = 1,...,n; m = 1,...,mh;
Uhm(x
′
h) > Uhm(xh) for some h = 1,...,n; m = 1,...,mh.
General Equilibrium: A competitive equilibrium is a triple (p;(x,y))
consisting of a price system p and an allocation (x,y) = ((xi)i∈I,(yj)j∈J)
such that
1. yj ∈ Yj(p) for all j ∈ J;
2. xh ∈ EBh(p) for all h ∈ H;
3. (x,y) is feasible, i.e., it satisﬁes (1).
In a general equilibrium, each ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts, every household makes
an eﬃcient choice under its budget constraint and markets clear. We obtain
a ﬁrst welfare theorem for economies with multi-member households and
production:
Proposition 1 Let (p;(x∗,y∗)) be a competitive equilibrium such that
p ∗ xh = wh(p) for all h = 1,...,n; xh ∈ EBh(p). (2)
Then (x∗,y∗) is a Pareto optimal allocation.
8proof. Suppose (x∗,y∗) is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists a










h) for some h = 1,...,n; m = 1,...,mh.










h) for some m = 1,...,mh.
Since x∗
h ∈ EBh(p), we get x′
h / ∈ Bh(p) for such an h:
p ∗ x
′
h > wh(p). (3)
(3) holds for all such households. For the remaining households, Uhm(x′
h) =
Uhm(x∗
h) for all m = 1,...,mh. If x′
h ∈ Bh(p), then x′
h ∈ EBh(p) because of
x∗
h ∈ EBh(p) and, consequently, p∗x′
h = wh(p) because of (2). If x′
h / ∈ Bh(p),
then (3) holds. In any case,
p ∗ x
′
h ≥ wh(p). (4)




















































































i = ω +
∑
j∈J y′
j, the feasibility of (x′,y′). Hence to the
contrary, (x∗,y∗) has to be Pareto optimal. 
3 Existence
In contrast to the existence proofs for pure exchange economies in Gersbach
and Haller (1999) and Sato (2010), who take the excess demand approach,
we rely on the simultaneous optimization or social equilibrium approach of
Arrow and Debreu (1954). In order to make the latter applicable, we re-
place each household’s consumption set Xh by the aggregate consumption
set Ah = I R
ℓ
+ so that (aggregate) consumption bundles and production plans
have equal dimension. We also need preferences on Ah = I R
ℓ
+ that reﬂect
household preferences. We are going to deﬁne a utility function Vh : Ah → I R
with the desired properties.
103.1 Preferences on Aggregate Household Consumption
Consider a household h with members i = hm,m = 1,...,mh and household
consumption set Xh =
∏mh
m=1 Xhm. We introduce the notation Ah = I R
ℓ
+ for
the household’s aggregate consumption set. We further deﬁne a canonical
mapping Ah : Xh −→ Ah that assigns to each household consumption plan
xh = (xh1,...,xhmh) the aggregate consumption Ah(xh) =
∑
m xhm. For
each ah ∈ Ah, we are interested in the inverse image A
−1
h (ah), the household
consumption plans that give rise to the aggregate consumption ah for house-
hold h. For all ah ∈ Ah, A
−1





h (ah), for example. Two properties obviously hold:
(P1) The correspondence A
−1
h : Ah → → Xh is convex and compact valued.
(P2) The correspondence A
−1
h : Ah → → Xh is continuous.





chm· Uhm(xh) for all xh ∈ Xh
where ch = (ch1,...,chmh) ∈ I R
mh
++. If each Uhm is continuous, then Wh is







is well deﬁned for all ah ∈ Ah. Moreover:
(P3) If each Uhm is continuous and concave, then Vh : Ah → I R is continuous
and concave.
Namely, Wh is continuous. In addition, (P1) and (P2) hold. Hence continu-
ity of Vh follows from Berge’s Maximum Theorem. If each Uhm is concave,
then Wh is concave as well. Now let ah,a′
h ∈ Ah and λ ∈ (0,1). There
11exist xh ∈ A
−1




h) such that Vh(ah) = Wh(xh) and
Vh(a′
h) = Wh(x′
h). Further, λ · xh + (1 − λ) · x′
h ∈ A
−1
h (λ · ah + (1 − λ) · a′
h)
and Wh(λ · xh + (1 − λ) · x′






λ · Vh(ah) + (1 − λ) · Vh(a′
h). This shows concavity of Vh.
3.2 Equilibrium Existence Result
We are now prepared to state an equilibrium existence result. Let Y =
∑
j Yj
denote the aggregate production set.
Proposition 2 A competitive equilibrium exists if
for every consumer i = hm,
(C) Ui is continuous and concave;
for every household h,
(H) ωh ≫ 0 and local non-satiation holds;
for every rm j,
(F) 0 ∈ Yj;
for the aggregate production set Y ,
(Y) Y is closed and convex; Y ∩ (−Y ) = {0};I R
ℓ
− ⊆ Y .
proof. Suppose (C) for all consumers i, (H) for all households h, (F) for
all ﬁrms j, and (Y) for the aggregate productions set. Fix a utilitarian social
welfare function Wh : Xh → I R for every household h. Consider the ﬁnite
Arrow-Debreu economy E = ((Ah,Vh,ωh)h∈H,(θhj)(h,j)∈H×J,(Yj)j∈J) where
Ah = I R
ℓ
+ and Vh is given by (5) for h ∈ H. Then:
(i) Each Ah is closed, convex, and bounded from below.
(ii) Each “consumer” h is locally non-satiated.
Namely, let ah ∈ Ah and ε > 0. Let xh ∈ A
−1
h (ah) with Vh(ah) = Wh(xh).
Because of (H), local non-satiation holds for household h: There exists x′
h ∈
12Xh with ∥ xh − x′
h ∥mhℓ < ϵ/mh and (Ui(x′
h))i∈h > (Ui(xh))i∈h. Then
Wh(x′
h) > Wh(xh). Let a′
h ≡ Ah(x′
h) ∈ Ah. It follows ∥ ah − a′
h ∥ℓ =
∥ Ah(xh) − Ah(x′





m=1 ∥ xhm − x′
hm ∥ℓ ≤
mh ∥ xh − x′
h ∥mhℓ < ϵ. Moreover, Vh(a′
h) ≥ Wh(x′
h) > Wh(xh) = Vh(ah).
Hence there exists a′
h ∈ Ah such that ∥ ah − a′
h ∥ℓ < ϵ and Vh(a′
h) > Vh(ah).
This shows that “consumer” h is locally non-satiated.
Further:
(iii) Each Vh is continuous and concave, by (P3).
(iv) ωh ≫ 0 for all h.
(v) 0 ∈ Yj for all j.
(vi) Y is closed and convex; Y ∩ (−Y ) = {0};I R
ℓ
− ⊆ Y .
(i)–(vi) imply that E satisﬁes the hypothesis of Theorem 5 of Debreu (1982).
Therefore, the economy E has a competitive equilibrium ((a∗
h)h∈H,(y∗
j)j∈J,p∗)









∗). Let x∗ = (x∗
i)i∈I and y∗ = (y∗
j)j∈J. We
claim that (p∗;(x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium of the economy with
multi-member households h ∈ H.
1. y∗
j ∈ Yj(p∗) for all j ∈ J, by the deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium
of E.
2. x∗
h ∈ EBh(p∗) for all h ∈ H. Namely, Vh(a∗
h) = max{Vh(ah) : ah ∈
Ah, p∗ah ≤ wh(p∗)}. Since a∗
h = Ah(x∗




h ∈ Bh(p∗). If x∗
h ̸∈ EBh(p∗), then there exists
x′
h ∈ Bh(p∗) such that Uhm(x′
h) ≥ Uhm(x∗
h) for all m = 1,...,mh
and Uhm(x′
h) > Uhm(x∗




h). Hence for a′
h = Ah(x′
h): a′








ing the fact that Vh(a∗
h) = max{Vh(ah) : ah ∈ Ah, p∗ah ≤ wh(p∗)}.
Therefore, x∗
h ∈ EBh(p∗) has to hold.

























j and, thus, (1).
We have shown that (p∗;(x∗,y∗)) satisﬁes conditions 1.–3. of a competitive
equilibrium for the economy with multi-member households h ∈ H. This
demonstrates the claim and completes the proof. 
4 Concluding Remarks
Proposition 1 means that, by and large, competitive exchange among proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrms and multi-member households satisfying the collective ra-
tionality model yields Pareto optimal allocations. Obviously, local non-
satiation of households prevails and a fortiori the budget exhaustion property
(2) holds if all individuals exhibit strict monotonicity in own consumption
and all intra-household consumption externalities are nonnegative. Example
3.1 in Haller (2000) illustrates that local non-satiation of households can still
hold if all individuals in multi-member households experience speciﬁc nega-
tive consumption externalities. But Example 1 in Sato (2009) demonstrates
that certain negative consumption externalities can lead to violation of (2)
(and of local non-satiation) and yield suboptimal equilibrium allocations.
Still, equilibrium allocations are always weakly Pareto optimal without any
further assumptions.
Proposition 2 states existence of a competitive equilibrium for a ﬁnite
economy with proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms and multi-member households satis-
fying the collective rationality model, under almost standard assumptions.
The only exception is the assumption of local non-satiation of households
which possibly can be replaced by weaker but less transparent assumptions.
Without any assumption of this kind, one can expect an equilibrium with
free disposal at best.
14General equilibrium analysis often includes a second welfare theorem, core
inclusion, core equivalence, and related issues. We are going to brieﬂy discuss
these topics as well as household production.
4.1 Second Welfare Theorem
Proposition 6 of Gersbach and Haller (2001) asserts validity of a second
welfare theorem for a pure exchange economy with ﬁxed household structure.
The proof of the proposition applies the separating hyperplane theorem. Like
similar proofs in the literature, it can easily incorporate production.
4.2 Core Theory
Haller (2000) presents a H-core inclusion result where in the deﬁnition of the
H-core or household core only unions of households in H qualify as coalitions.
Again, the budget exhaustion property (2) proves instrumental. There is a
sizeable literature on coalition-production economies, e.g. B¨ ohm (1974) and
Hildenbrand (1974, Ch. 4), where each coalition is endowed with its own
technology. This approach provides an elegant way to extend the methods
developed for pure exchange economies, but tends to ignore individual own-
ership of means of production. In other cases, individual private property in
ﬁrms does not fully apply. Debreu and Scarf (1963) assume that production
technologies are publicly available and exhibit constant returns to scale so
that issues related to corporate control are absent. Allingham (1975) and
Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1987) assume divisibility of technologies
and that each shareholder controls a fraction of the ﬁrm’s technology which
avoids conﬂicts among shareholders.
In general economies with production and private property, the question
arises when and how a coalition of consumers or households can alter the
production plan of a ﬁrm that is not entirely owned by the coalition. First
attempts to deal with this intricate question and to take fully into account
15the ramiﬁcations of private property have been made by Haller (1991) and
Xiong and Zheng (2007). This complex issue is left to future research.
4.3 Household Production
By most accounts, household production creates substantial value in most
economies. It was the article of Becker (1965) that positioned the use of time
and household production ﬁrmly within economic theory. At the micro level,
Becker’s work and a rich subsequent literature (see e.g. Apps and Rees (2009)
for a discussion) demonstrate that household production constitutes a major
determinant of household welfare. For those reasons, a comprehensive ac-
count and description of household activities and intra-household allocation
ought to include household production.4
Delineating household production in general equilibrium frameworks, how-
ever, proves diﬃcult. The most stringent deﬁnition would require that the
household uses its own factors of production to produce goods for its own
consumption only. But households which are autarkic with respect to all
factors of production barely exist. For example, to bake a cake, most of the
basic ingredients are typically purchased in the market. A less stringent def-
inition requires that labor and capital are owned by the household whereas
intermediate products can be obtained in the market. Yet even then, house-
holds living in rental housing, for example, would not qualify for household
production.
Within a general equilibrium framework, Gilles and Diamantaras (2003)
assume that each consumer is endowed with his own home production set.
They distinguish between tradeable and non-tradeable commodities. A con-
sumer’s productive activity is only considered household or home production
if the output consists of non-tradeable commodities. Individuals can own
4At the macro level, the value of household production is signicant and could be
around 35 percent of GDP in developed countries (see Apps and Rees (2009), p. 32).
16and consume non-tradeable commodities, but they are restricted to consum-
ing their home produced quantities of these non-tradeables. Now almost any
commodity is tradeable at some time in some place. But that is exactly
Gilles’s and Diamantaras’s point: tradeability is an endogenous, temporal
and local feature. Gilles and Diamantaras (2003) demonstrate that welfare
analysis involving transfers — adopting a valuation equilibrium concept to
be precise — can be performed with their formalization of home production
and its connection with tradeability. Yet showing existence of a competitive
equilibrium that ceteris paribus respects private property rights seems be-
yond reach.
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